Econ 414-3: Economics of Information

Northwestern University, Winter 2021
Time: 11:00-12:50 Tue/Thu
Location: zoom
Office hours: by appointment

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1 Logistics

Zoom lectures are taxing, so we will divide each 110 minute lecture into two halves:

- 11 to 11:50
- 10 min break
- 12 to 12:50

2 Schedule

2.1 Contracting for information and delegation

2.2 Dynamic mechanisms

2.3 Information design
2. Privately informed receiver: Kolotilin et al. (2017), Guo and Shmaya (2019a)
3. Dynamics: Kremer et al. (2014), Che and Hörner (2017)
4. BCE and its applications: Bergemann and Morris (2016b), Bergemann et al. (2015)

2.4 Robust mechanism design

Requirement
Students are required to read all papers, submit two “referee reports” and make a 50 minute presentation.

References


Ariel Rubinstein. *An optimal conviction policy for offenses that may have been committed by accident*. Springer, 1979.