

Harry PEI

CONTACT INFORMATION	2211 Campus Drive, Office 3391 Evanston, IL, 60208.	Webpage: sites.northwestern.edu/harrypei/ Email: harrydp@northwestern.edu
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Political Economy, Law and Economics.	
EMPLOYMENT	Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Northwestern University	since 2018
	Visiting Faculty, Cowles Foundation, Yale University	2023-2024
EDUCATION	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, PhD in Economics	2013-2018
	Toulouse School of Economics, MA in Economics	2011-2013
	Tsinghua University, BA in Mathematics	2007-2011
HONORS AND AWARDS	NSF CAREER Award SES-2337566 Reputation with Limited Information.	2024-2029
	Northwestern University Career Development Grant.	2023-2024
	<i>AER: Insights</i> Excellence in Refereeing Award.	2023
	NSF Standard Grant SES-1947021, Monotone Methods in Reputations.	2020-2024
	<i>Review of Economic Studies</i> European Tour	2018
	Robert Solow Prize for Excellence in Research and Teaching, MIT	2018
	Best TA of the Year Award, Department of Economics, MIT	2017
	Ho-Ching and Han-Ching Scholarship, MIT	2016
	Department of Economics Fellowship, MIT	2013-2015
	Jean-Jacques Laffont Fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics	2011-2013
PUBLICATION	Robust Implementation with Costly Information, with Bruno Strulovici. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , forthcoming.	
	Reputation Effects under Short Memories. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , forthcoming, a one-page abstract appears in the Proceedings of EC'23.	
	Repeated Communication with Private Lying Costs. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 210, 105668, June 2023.	
	Reputation Building under Observational Learning. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 90(3), 1441-1469, May 2023.	
	A Reputation for Honesty. with Drew Fudenberg and Ying Gao, <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 204, 105508, September 2022.	

Reputations for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 201, 105438, April 2022.

Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment. *Theoretical Economics*, 16, 449–475, May 2021.

Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games. with Yingkai Li, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 193, 105222, April 2021.

Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values. *Econometrica*, 88(5), 2175–2202, September 2020.

Monotone Equilibria in Signaling Games. with Shuo Liu, *European Economic Review*, 124, 103408, May 2020.

When Does Restricting Your Opponent's Freedom Hurt You? *Games and Economic Behavior*, 100, 234–239, November 2016.

Communication with Endogenous Information Acquisition. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 160, 132–149, December 2015.

WORKING PAPERS Reputation Effects with Endogenous Records.

Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records.

Reputational Bargaining and Inefficient Technology Adoption, with Maren Vairo.

Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility, with Bruno Strulovici.

Building Trust in Government: The Opportunities and Challenges of Adverse Shocks, with Avidit Acharya and Edoardo Grillo.

Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags, with Yingkai Li.

Reputation with Strategic Information Disclosure.

ACADEMIC
EXPERIENCE

Reviewer: National Science Foundation, *Econometrica*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *American Economic Review*, *AER Insights*, *AEJ-Micro*, *AEJ-Policy*, *Journal of Finance*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Theoretical Economics*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *RAND Journal of Economics*, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *International Economic Review*, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *Journal of Law and Economics*, *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, *Economic Letters*, *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, *Journal of Legal Studies*, *Mathematics of Operations Research*.

Program Committee: EC 2024, EC 2023, WINE 2023, WINE 2022.

Seminars: **2023-24** Harvard-MIT, Brown University, Boston University, University of Pittsburgh, University of Miami, Yale University, University College London, University of Manchester, University of Warwick, University of Edinburgh, Royal Holloway University of London, European University Institute, University of Tokyo, Hitotsubashi University, National University of Singapore, University of Oxford, **2022-23** University of Pennsylvania, New York University, University of Bonn, Bocconi University, Aalto University, University

of New South Wales, FGV-EPGE. **2021-22** Columbia University, Stanford GSB, CMU-University of Pittsburgh, HKU-HKUST-CUHK joint theory seminar, UC Riverside, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris Game Theory Seminar, IAE-CSIC and Autonomous University of Barcelona, **2020-21** University of Michigan, UCLA, Aalto University, Bilkent University, Peking University, Seminar in Economic Theory (SET), Virtual Formal Theory Workshop, One World Mathematical Game Theory Seminar. **2019-20** Paris School of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, Ohio State University, Michigan State University, University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, Ecole Polytechnique, University of Warwick, Singapore Management University, Nanyang Technological University, McMaster University. **2018-19** University of Pennsylvania, Duke University-UNC Chapel Hill, University of Chicago, University of Texas Austin, University of Rochester, University of Carlos III Madrid, CEMFI, MIT Sloan, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Tsinghua University, Peking University, Paris Game Theory Seminar, HEC Paris, University College London, Pennsylvania State University, Western University, University of Toronto, ITAM. **2017-18** Princeton University, Harvard University, Northwestern University, UC Berkeley, Kellogg MEDS, University of Southern California, Queen Mary University of London, CERGE-EI Prague, University of Copenhagen, ITAM, Durham Business School, University of Warwick.

Conference Talks: AEA-ASSA Meeting (2024, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2015, 2013), Canadian Economic Theory Conference (2024, 2023, 2022, 2020), Great Lakes Political Economy Theory Conference (2024), Digital Economics Conference in Toulouse (2024), Contract Theory Workshop in Osaka (2024), SITE Dynamic Game Session (2023, 2018, 2016), Becker-Friedman Institute Theory Conference (2023), EC Conference (2023), Workshop in Honour of David Levine (2023), UChicago-Northwestern Theory Conference (2023), ANU Organizational Economics Workshop (2023), Markets, Contracts, and Organizations Workshop (2023), Southern Economic Association Conference (2022), Transatlantic Theory Workshop (2022, 2021, 2019, 2018), Conference for Drew Fudenberg's 65th birthday (2022), KIT-Paris-ZEW Market Design Workshop (2022), 8th Relational Contract Workshop (2022), 6th Bargaining Workshop in Heidelberg (2022), Northwestern-Toulouse IO Conference (2022), Cowles Theory Conference (2021), Theory Conference at Collegio Carlo Alberto (2021), Conference on Network Science (2021), Tsinghua University Alumni Conference (2021), Midwest Theory Conference (2021), SITE Political Economy Session (2020), UC Riverside Theory Workshop (2020), Midwest Economic Theory Conference (2021), SAET Conference (2019), Stony Brooks Game Theory Conference (2019), Arizona State University Theory Conference (2018), Minnesota-Chicago Accounting Theory Conference (2018), Workshop on Communication in Montréal (2018), Kansas Theory Workshop (2018), Tsinghua BEAT Workshop (2018), Norms, Actions, and Games Workshop in Toulouse (2016).

Scheduled Talks: Toulouse School of Economics, Emory University.

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

Instructor for Intermediate Microeconomics (310-2), Economic Theory and Methods (412-3), and Information Economics (414-3) at Northwestern University.

Instructor for Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Econ 520) at Yale University.

Invited guest lectures and minicourses on Repeated Games and Reputations at University of Oxford (Spring 2024), University of Pennsylvania (Spring 2023), Columbia University (Fall 2021), and Pennsylvania State University (Spring 2019).

PERSONAL

US Permanent Resident.